“Continui sa cred ca putem construi o Romanie in care europenismul sa nu fie doar o «forma fara fond»” – afirmă Crin Antonescu, presedinte PNL

- Domnule Crin Antonescu, aveti deja o experienta de 19 ani pe scena politica din Romania. Si pentru ca vorbim de saptamanalul “Top Business”, voi incepe acest interviu adresandu-va o intrebare pragmatica, specifica oamenilor de afaceri. Care sunt avantajele si dezavantajele persoanelor care au statutul de politician de/in Romania ?

Crin Antonescu: – Inteleg ca intrebarea se refera in general la oamenii politici si la realitatile din Romania, nu la mine … Voi incerca sa fiu la fel de pragmatic si concis.
Avantaje: unu – politicienii “deschid usi” intr-o masura incomparabil mai mare decat ceilalti cetateni; doi – un politician are sansa unor salturi spectaculoase, justificate sau nu, in cariera, sansa de asemenea incomparabila cu a majoritatii cetatenilor, indiferent de profesie sau domeniu de cariera; trei – politicienii au avut sansa unui acces direct si imediat la resursele financiare, deci sansa de a se imbogati a fost net superioara majoritatii populatiei. Astea au fost percepute ca avantaje si urmarite in buna masura de cei care au optat pentru cariera politica. Iar, din pacate, generatia tanara nu a venit spre domeniul politic ca urmare a unor idealuri si credinte, ci strict pentru a obtine aceste avantaje.
Dezavantaje: unu – lipsa de credibilitate, pentru ca, desi nicaieri in lume politicienii nu sunt prea iubiti, in Romania ei nu sunt deloc respectati, ceea ce constituie un handicap important pentru un om politic; doi – sunt, intr-un fel si din vina lor, victime ale perceptiei publice despre ei insisi; ca sa simplificam, isi inchipuie fara temei ca sunt sau au devenit cineva, numai pentru ca, fara a-i respecta in fapt, lumea se comporta  reverentios cu ei; trei – au o sansa mai mica in ce priveste acel aspect pretios pentru fiecare om, adica viata privata, viata de familie.

- Extinzand putin spatiul de discutie, cum credeti ca e perceput pe plan extern statutul de om politic roman ?

CA: – Daca ne referim la perceptia externa, trebuie sa admitem ca politicienii romani au o conditie destul de fragila. Dar am vazut, ce-i drept de la distanta, ca si in acest context functioneaza vechea zicala “Omul sfinteste locul” si ca depinde de fiecare in parte cum este perceput, respectat, pretuit. Evident, in acest context nu putem face abstractie si de anumite conditionari care nu tin direct de capacitatile oamenilor politici. Ca presedinte al Romaniei, prim ministru sau ministru de externe (ma refer la aceste trei functii deoarece ele au cea mai mare vizibilitate in plan extern) poti fi un om cu adevarat exceptional, dar tot vor exista limitari care tin de pozitia tarii pe care o reprezinti, de importanta ei, de esicherul politic, de perceptia prin mass-media si de realitatea ei de perceptie. [more]

interview conducted by G. Ionita

Publicat în Top Business, no. 767 ( 28 mai – 3 iunie 2009)

Medvedev’s message in a bottle

The crisis’ fangs and the Russia’s economy, or about the traps of sovereign democracy – In dialogue with John Helmer

John Helmer is the longest continuously serving foreign correspondent in Russia, and the only western journalist to direct his own bureau independent of single national or commercial ties. He first set up his bureau in 1989, making him today the doyen of the foreign press corps in Russia. Born and educated in Australia, then at Harvard University, Helmer has also been a professor of political science, and an advisor to government heads in Greece (Andreas Papandreou), the United States (Jimmy Carter), and Sri Lanka (J.R.Jayewardene). Before Russia, Helmer published several books in the US on military and political topics. Essays on the American presidency and on urban policy in the US followed in book compilations in 1981 and 1982; essays on Greek and Middle Eastern politics between 1986 and 1989. Since 1989 he has published almost exclusively on Russian topics. Today,  Helmer is one of the most widely read  specialists in the business world for his news-breaking stories on Russian oil and gas, base and precious metals, diamonds, mining, shipping, insurance,  and business policy.

- Recently, President Medvedev urged Russian oligarchs to pay their “moral debt”? What does this mean in concrete terms?
- Moral debt in Russia is a case of the three monkeys who see, hear, and speak no evil. In theory, the Russian President means that men who seized most of Russia’s natural resource wealth more than a decade ago by a combination of corrupt and fraudulent means, and then generated vast fortunes abroad by manipulating Rus­sia’s weak tax and capital controls, have an enormous debt to repay to the state and the economy. In practice, Medvedev does not intend to name names, let alone take any action to collect that debt, whether moral or fiscal.
Indeed, Medvedev is going to unusual lengths to protect one of the oligarchs, Oleg Deripaska, from having to honour the loan obligations he has to Russia’s state banks, as well as to a group of more than 70 commercial banks, some Russian,  most foreign. If anyone in Russia carries the largest moral, as well as money debt today, it is Deripaska. Consider then why Medvedev said, at a regional confe­ren­ce in Irkutsk on February 20, in Deripaska’s presence: “I fully agree with what Oleg Vladimirovich [Deri­pa­s­ka] said about situations when the crisis leads to settling scores… There should be no situations when different  structures’ rivalry can lead to the collapse of  an entire group of com­panies… Such actions should get adequate reaction from the state. For that purpose we have one serious institution, the government of the Russian Federation… There are situations when power must be used.”
In case anyone was in doubt that Medvedev meant to reach up, and put his arm around Deripaska, he repeated the message at a Kremlin meeting on March 17. On that occasion, the presi­dent was meeting with Mikhail Frid­man, controlling shareholder of the Alfa Bank group. Alfa, to whom Deri­paska is overdue in repaying between $650 million and $1 billion, has led the commercial banks in launching court action in Moscow, and also in Jersey (where Deripaska registers some of his companies). Medvedev the lawyer appeared to be telling Fridman the banker: “We cannot sacrifice entire companies with many thousands of staff to meet the ambitions of certain credit organizations.”
It is one thing for a politician not to mean what he says, or to mean different things to different audiences. It is quite another thing for a politician to say things he has no power to do, with  the purpose of intending to do in secret what he would not dare ack­nowledge in public. In Medvedev’s case, he has been attempting to save Deripaska from the folly of the latter’s actions, many of them grave violations of Russian law; and save him from the very same bankruptcy procedures in the Russian courts by means of which Deripaska took control of many of his Russian properties. With debts owed by United Company Rusal and the companies of the Basic Element exceeding $20 billion; with an obligation to the founding shareholder and former partner, Mikhail Chernoy, of more than $6 billion; and with cash-out obligations to other shareholders of at least another $15 billion, noone is more indebted in Russia than Deripaska. Some even claim that he has lost a personal fortune of more than $10 billion in cash taken out of the Russian businesses, and either invested with the Rothschilds, or spent on luxury real estate in London, New York, France, India, and Japan. If the­re’s a moral in oligarch debt, Medvedev doesn’t need his secret agents to tell him how big that moral is in Deri­pas­ka’s case. But the president is doing more than covering his eyes.  Medvedev has authorized two of his subordinates – his economic advisor, Arkady Dvorkovich, and the head of his anti-crisis committee, Igor Shuvalov – to write letters, call meetings, and make announcements to the banks with the intention of saving Deripaska from forfeiting his assets. Not a word has been said about the notorious tax evasion schemes that have been documented in the UK, demonstrating how Deripaska looted Russian resour­ce wealth and hid it abroad. Not a word about Deripaska’s record of deceiving business partners, violating share­hol­der agreements, blackening rivals’ names – all evidenced in the records and rulings of the courts of the UK, Switzerland, and the US.
In the traditional Japanese maxim of the Three Monkeys, there’s actually a fourth monkey. He is meant to signify: “Do no evil”; he is usually depicted with his hand on his crotch. In Moscow today, the president has adapted this maxim for Deripaska, and added a variant of the Hippocratic Oath for doc­tors. Medvedev’s message for Deri­paska is – “you do the evil, I’ll do you no harm”.

- “It is time that the Russian Ruble to become a regional exchange currency stable against the global financial instability”, said President Dmitry Medvedev in last summer. In turn, Minister Kudrin spoke about the fact that Russian Ruble regional currencies will become the next 5 years. How realistic are these goals in the context of this global crisis that Ruble has proved to be quite weak ?
- When the Soviet Union collapsed, and Russia was seized by Boris Yeltsin, the destruction of the rouble was one of the priority targets of three Washing­ton administrations – US President Bill Clinton, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. The reason was simple. As the reserve currency for the Soviet states, the rouble gave enormous monetary policy power to the Central Bank of Russia. Prising these states away from Moscow, and subordinating Russian monetary policy to Washington, required replacing the rouble with the dollar. This was a great success. Within five years, out of the territory of the old Union popped the somoni, tenge, manta, sum, dram, hyrvnia, lats, lari, kroon, and litas. If you can’t readily pin which name to what country these currencies repre­sent, never mind – all of these eco­nomies have remained dollarized.
But the Russian rouble has been able to revive. That is due in part to the poten­cy of Chinese demand for imported resources to support that country’s economic growth. In large measure also, the rouble has revived becau­se of the catastrophic policies pursued by Clinton and his successor George Bush, including their several failed wars, the last of which was Georgia’s August 2008 invasion of Ossetia. The cost of these American wars, however, hasn’t been as disas­trous for the dollar as the global boom in oil, gas, and other commodities.
The huge money surpluses gene­rated by this boom for Russian state and commercial organizations com­pel­led the Kremlin — indeed every Rus­sian with cash on his hands —  to find hedges against the loss of dollar value. It was thus inevitable that Russian strategy would begin to focus on methods for protecting Russian asset value from the dollar risks. The higher oil, gas, nickel, and other Russian expor­ts rose in dollar-denominated price, the plainer and more urgent the policy imperative became to deal with dollar risk. The crash of the US banks, followed by the bankruptcy of US credit organizations, and the exposure of unprecedented failure by the US market regulators has triggered rouble weakness, but only because demand for commodities and trade collapsed first. This is how Prime Minister Vladi­mir Putin publicly analyzed the situation at Davos recently. Calling the dollar “virtual money”, backed by “made-up reports and doubtful ra­tings”, Putin did what is rare at Davos. He said the obvious: “excessive dependence on what is basically the only reserve currency is dangerous for the world economy… most countries keep their international reserves in foreign currencies. And they would want to be confident of their security. In their turn, the emitters of the reserve and accounting currencies are objectively interested to see that their money is in demand in other coun­tries.”
Even more recently, the Chinese Central Bank Governor, Zhou Xiao­chuan, said the same thing, obliging the US Secretary of the Treasury, Tim Geithner,  to stumble embarrassingly, and with immediate impact on the dol­lar, also over the obvious. Commenting on the Chinese proposal to expand use of special drawing rights (SDRs), ins­tead of the dollar, Geithner said: “we are quite open to that”. As the dollar dropped 1.3% in a flash, Geithner was obliged to clarify his remark by saying: “I think the dollar remains the world’s dominant reserve currency.” If that wasn’t a nano-second demonstration of the weakness of the dollar, I’ll eat my roubles. But the fact is, as Putin, Zhou, and Geithner agree, there is mutual currency weakness right now. The cure for that is also mutuality and interdependency. So far as Russia is concerned, Yeltsin tried burying                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               rou­­ble, because the Americans told him to do what was good for them. Now Yeltsin is buried, and the rouble is once again alive. But Russian currency policy is no longer in the hands of simpletons and puppets.
- Western analysts have expressed serious doubts when Prime Minister Putin said that the strategy in 2020 will not undergo major adjustments. How to view these adjustments now, in the 2009 budget recalculation, of expected decreases in the rate of economic growth, massive withdrawals of capital on the Russian market and increasing unemployment, volatile exchange rate ?
- Western analysts on Russia are about as useful as three-ply toilet paper. When Russian hotel-rooms were short of toilet paper, visitors with sensitive arses were obliged to bring rolls of their own in their suitcases. Nowadays, the Russian arse can choose, and the western quality isn’t any longer the best for the cost. There’s nothing especially Russian about this — arses of all nationalities are being obliged to undergo what you call “major adjustments”.
It isn’t much of an over-simplication to say that Russian economic recovery now depends on the rate of China’s growth. But that amounts to an acknowledgement that the Kremlin has defaulted and failed on the one foundation of its economic policy everyone believed in, a year ago. This was that, no matter how severely the global economy contracted in demand for energy and raw materials, there was so much latent demand in the domestic Russian economy, and so much surplus in state cash reserves, Russian industry and GDP could, and definitely would, continue to grow. As policy doctrine goes, this was pure Keynesian demand stimulus strategy. But it has been failing for the very thing Putin thought he had sewn up over the past eight years – the POWER VERTICAL.
That is the structure of political and administrative power. It is supposed to work. But it doesn’t. The Kremlin hasn’t been able to drive its money stimulus through the banking system, and into sustaining consumer demand and domestic investment. The car and home builders couldn’t find buyers, so they stopped ordering materials. The steelmakers  turned off their furnaces. Factories switched off their lights. The electricity plants told Gazprom and the steam-coal mines to stop deliveries. Trucks, trains and container ships stop­ped running. And everyone stopped paying their bills. Instead of lending the roubles the state’s bailout bankers were handing over to resuscitate working capital, the banks converted the funds into dollars – and maximized profit that was hoarded on the balance-sheet against the rising sum of provisions for loan writeoffs and asset writedowns.
This is how it has been proved that Putin doesn’t control his economy. His embarrassment in front of the much more effective performance of his Chinese counterpart is sharp. But Putin is hardly alone in the world on this score, is he? And  Chinese misery is not so transparent that the relative command and control of the Beijing leadership can be measured reliably.
- The last file Russia versus Ukraina from series „Gas crisis” born of numerous controversies on both sides of his: economic and political. To speak of a clear win on Russia’s media war. And a relative economic gain. But Russia has gained something in relation with the European Union ? Not like, beyond the European diplomacy, Russia lost to Chapter Credibility?
- What short memories we all suffer from. Why are Europeans so forgetful that it was the Germans who pioneered the use of gas as a weapon of war?
It was also the 19th century German politician Otto von Bis­mar­ck, who famously claimed that politics is the art of the possible — before he sent his armies to invade westwards.
To judge the outcome of January’s purported  “gas war”, initially between Russia and Ukraine, but then involving many of the East European states as well, Russia’s prime minister and his Ukrainian counterpart, Yulia Tymo­shenko, ended up devising the politics of the impossible, thereby warming Ukrainian stoves for less cost, whi­le earning Gazprom, Russia’s principal enterprise, more profit, at least on paper. For the first time, it is possible to read the text of the gas agreement, signed on January 19 by Gazprom and Naftogas Ukrainy, and judge the outcome yourself, for the papers were  released to the press in Kiev, even though Gazprom officials refused to answer questions about the terms of the contract, and their impact on Gaz­prom’s revenues, as well as on East European gas prices for con­sumers.
The Russian position ended up being focused on defining the price of gas at Ukraine’s eastern frontier; establishing a formula for quarterly adjustments to this price for the remain­der of this year; fixing the volumes of new gas to be delivered to Ukrainian consumers and to European customers for the quarter, and for the year;  and to exclude commercial inter­me­diaries  upstream, between Gaz­prom and Naftogas, while allowing them downstream, between Naftogas and end-users in Ukraine.
Accordingly, Gazprom was careful to avoid stepping into the highly politicized Ukrainian debate over the internal terms of supply, mix of new and old gas, and price at consumption. Since January, it has been obvious that the clash between Tymoshenko and Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko has continued over those terms. This confirms Moscow’s contention from the start of the conflict that the cause of the gas stoppage to Europe was Ukrainian in origin and motive, not Russian. If that is accepted, there is no substance to the Anglo-American com­plaint that Russia is an unreliable energy supplier, wielding its gas and oil as weapons against its adversaries. Put this in the Romanian context, and ask whether you, who hardly sell or buy anything at all from the Ukraine, would choose Yushchenko and Tymoshenko as preferred partners and clients, if you had a choice? [read more...]

interview by Gabriela Ionita

Published in Cadran Politic Review, no. 65, april/2009

International solidarity with our cause is a key factor, that united with dissidence both inside and outside Cuba will give us victory – consider ex-ally Fidel Castro, prof. Pedro Fuentes Cid, spokeman of Politico Presidio Cubano

Pedro Fuentes Cid had fought for the liberation of Cuba to free its people from under the corrupted hands of the dictator Batista. Soon he had realized that Castro had betrayed the revolution and was a tyrant. One day while he getting from a friends house the army fired over a hundred shoots into his car as he returned fire. In the end he said he could not believe he lived because there were over 140 bullet holes in the car. He said he is convinced he survived because of his faith in God. Now, Pedro Fuentes-Cid live in Miami (USA) and is one of the key-people in the negotiation for future of Cube.

Mr. Fuentes, tell us, Fidel Castro and Raul Castro – convinced the Communists, or the proclamation of a communist ideology for them is a necessary measure, as a way to preserve their own influence in the country by means of a strong Soviet Union?

Fidel Castro used the communist ideology as a way to remain in power and also for protection against the USA due to his anti-american feelings. His favorite book was Mein Kamp by Adolf Hitler, but he could not steer the revolution in the Nazi direction, so resorting to a strong Soviet Union gave him also financial support.

Recently, Raoul Castro was in visit to Moscow and singned a treat with president Medvedev, but without reveals about. What do you thing ?

I think the main reason for Raul to visit Moscow was the same that drove him to Brazil and Venezuela, to ask for food. The Cuban government at that time did not have food to offer the population for the following week, and now after all his visits is still short.

What kind of goals had been pursue the struggle against Batista originally?

The main goal was to overthrow the dictatorship in order to bring Democracy back to Cuba. There were not many premises set by the majority of the groups involved in the struggle. The constitutional government of an elected President had been violated and most of us just wanted to make the Constitution of 1940 prevail.

[more...]

interview conducted by Gabriela Ionita, with contribution Mr.  Ingvar Miller (Russia)

Published in Cadran Politic Review, no. 64/march 2009

About Russia policy, sovereign democracy and Putin’ strategy with expert on international relations and security, Vilhelm Konnander

Vilhelm Konnander: „Russia’s strive for recognition as an equal in international affairs is, in my view, the greatest flaw in Moscow policy”

- One of the declared priorities of the Putin-Medvedev regime is to make Russia a regional and international financial power as well. Therefore, while both the media and Occidental analists sustain that Russia is on the verge of collapsing, Moscow tries to show the contrary (I speak here about the loan to Island, to the International Monetary Fund, the funds used for holding APEC). Moreover, premier Putin declared that the country development strategy set until 2020 is not going to suffer major changes, regardless of the international crisis. How much of all this is pure truth and how much is mistification from both the international analists and Moscow autorities?

V.K.: – There is frequently a tendency towards katastroika scenarios in western analysis of Russia. It is said that Moscow is digging its own grave. Still, despite regular crises, the country seems to have an extraordinary capacity of muddling through. For good reasons, many analysts now fear macroeconomic imbalances primarily due to a fall in international oil prices, reiterating patterns of the past: 1986, 1994, and 1998. In recent history, Russian crises tend to coincide with a decline in demand and prices of oil. So, it is now easy to jump to the conclusion that Russia again is on the verge of financial collapse, judging from such one-factor analysis.

What is the difference this time, is the big financial reserves Moscow has amassed during the good years. In biblical analogy, the big question is to what extent Russia, after seven good years, now is prepared for seven bad years. There are no good answers, but the observation that Russian state finances this time over are better than when the country has previously been confronted by great challenges.

As for the 2020 strategy, reform is always difficult during times of crisis. As is typical of Russia, policy formation is often an instrument both of state action and tending to the interests of politico-economic élites. This is also the case of the 2020 strategy – as its forerunner, the Putin plan. The importance of policy 2020 cannot be underestimated. It is on the one hand a strategy for economic development and diversification at a time when long-term macro-factors desperately need to be addressed, and on the other hand a vital formula for preserving élite interests. At the core, strategy 2020 is a far-reaching project to tackle problems ahead at the same time as it intends to ensure the internal cohesion of the élite and the continued redistribution of wealth underpinning it. Without continuous financing of a reform policy catering to the needs of the élite, both economy and political stability stand at peril. When Gleb Pavlovsky, Russia’s primary political spindoctor, floats the question whether plan 2020 will survive, most analysts should therefore raise their eyebrows due to the fundamental importance of this type of policy – regardless of what it is called at the moment. It was the policy that brought the Putin-Medvedev tandem into power, and should it fall, repercussions may be felt for a long time to come.

Concerning Moscow’s moves on the international financial markets, the political and economic rationales are intertwined. It is a combination of sustenance of the international financial system as well as investment and expansion into new markets. Thus, there is little particular to Russian actions within this sphere, as there is a objective need to invest state reserves and diversify investement risks.

Consequently, crying out collapse for the Russian economy is uninteresting without properly analysing facts and potential consequences a crisis might have for politics and society as a whole. Without this, the question of strong or weak is but a worthless value statement.

- Certainly you have heard many times: Gazprom is a weapon for blackmailing the West, or a tool for stuffing the pockets of the Kremlin bureaucrats. What is your opinion ? Even if never delivered, the status of Russia at present is tolerated because of the dependence of Europe its energy resources. Acceptance as a equal partner would change anything? Gazprom would have a gun less than feared?

V.K.: – In my view, this is simply an issue of classical dual use. If Gazprom, for pure economic reasons, acts against foreign customers not paying their due, it would be stupid not to expoit also the political fear of turning off the energy tap. It should thus be clearly stated that economic interests are primary to political, even if the latter may be forwarded as a consequence of actions to forward the former. As Bill Clinton once put it: „It’s the economy, stupid!”

- The Summit G 20 sessions showed a visible discrepancy (related to the solutions for the crisis) between USA’s and Europe’s (sustained by Russia, after Nisa Summit) points of view. Admitting that Bush administration is trying to minimize its mistakes by sustaining these points of view, do you think that there is going to be a reconciliation after President Elect Obama moves in the White House?

V.K.: – Hopes for a new Bretton Woods were highly exaggerated in the runup to the Nisa meeting. That no groundbreaking results were reached is only part of an ongoing political process, where it is far too early to speak of any rift between Europe and the US in handling the international financial crisis. With unrealistic expectations next to any result from such a meeting is bound to be disappointing. As for Russia’s role, it would be erroneous for the country not to forward its positions and interests, even if it means exploiting differences in the Transatlantic axis.

As for a rapproachement between the White House and the Kremlin, president elect, Barack Obama, has signalled an interest in resuming a closer dialogue between the US and Russia. However, this is an issue of change in the overall American foreign policy paradigm where realism might be exchanged for a more ideaslistic approach to international relations. Speaking more about values might actually not be in the interest of Moscow, as it would create greater complexity than the current simplicity of realism. A value based dialogue can therefore prove a less tempting alternative to Russia than the current situation, not least as the country’s leadership wants to avoid a new Helsinki process or the resurge of coloured revolutions. In Russia, realism reigns, and reconcilitation remains a matter of symbolic policy, as long as soft values are not adjoined by real value – political or economic.

- In the same context, can we say that the international crisis has some good effects as being the premise for Russia and European Union to speak a common language? Or are we just dealing with a temporary solidarity that’s going to be forgotten as soon as new discussions about the security strategies, the dependency of the Russian energetic resources, Georgia and Ukraine adherence to OTAN start?

V.K.: – International politics contain little solidarity. Bandwagoning for avoiding or addressing a global financial crisis is something done only when the system itself is at risk. As soon as immediate dangers are averted, relations are likely to return to business as usual. Here, the European Union stands divided, and Russia may continue to exploit differences to its own advantage. To be frank, Moscow would be stupid not to. Thus, we might expect the continuation of Russian forum-shopping, advancing its interests in fora after fora, organization after organization, not least over differences among NATO-members over further expansion of the organization. It will take a new Gorbachev for this to change, and that would be the last thing most Russians would want now. So, differences are likely to live on, and various Russian state and élite interests will continue contrast to western, even up to the breaking-point in many issues. As the Georgia case illustrates, the difficulty now is to ascertain the position of this breaking-point, for both Russian politicians and western analysts. The biggest risk at the moment is that things get out of hand without most actors realizing the severity of a specific situation or combination of factors.

- You have a very good knowledge of the realities in the ex-soviet countries. On considering the harsh fight to control the underground resources as much as Russia’s will to conserve its influence, how much of Russia’s wish to be acknowledged as one of the region’s powers is eligible and how much is a sideslip from the international laws? (as suggested by the Occident, in different times). Also, you was part of the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) which presented one of the first more comprehensive analyses of the recent war in Georgia at a press seminar in Stockholm. What conclusions can be drawn in this respect the analysis of the conflict with Georgia?

V.K.: – Russia’s strive for recognition as an equal in international affairs is, in my view, the greatest flaw in Moscow policy. Still, its history – originating in 15th century relations between Ivan III and Habsburg Emperor Frederick III – is too old for it to change. What use is there of influence if it only exhausts Russian resources and in the process makes most neighbours hostile to Moscow? The basic question should be how to use existing influence and not the per se possession of it. Any droit de régard must be regarded in terms of how it might forward Russian interests, and not merely having them. Anything else is but a waste of time and resources, which is something few big powers can afford in the long run. So, one should make a distinction between Russia as a natural big power in world or regional politics, and useless pretences for great power status. The rigidity of great power existence is but a curse to Russia.

As for international law aspects of the Russo-Georgian conflict, it is correct to point to the legal analogy of Kosovo and secessionist Georgian regions. However, when compared to Kosovo, the fundamental issue of proportion is difficult to address for Moscow. Motivating intervention due to an alleged genocide is no great method if it turns out that so is not the case, especially if Russian countermeasures are disproportionate. However, this is an issue for jurists to debate. What is at the core of the Georgia conflict, and the potential future behaviour of Russia, is whether this is the application of sovereign democracy – United Russia’s party ideology – to foreign policy. If so, the west and all neighbouring countries are up for a total reassessment of how Moscow regards and pursues world affairs. As I see it, this is clearly an issue that more western analysts should turn attention to.

- Starting from these “lessons” that would be how to resolve frozen conflicts in other ex-Soviet space (Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh)?

V.K.: – I have great difficulties to see why Russia would have any interest whatsoever of resolving any frozen conflict on post-soviet ground. There is simply nothing in it for ­Moscow. If something is working, there is little reason to change it out of some obscure benevolence towards the international system or the urge to end conflict. However, in cases where there is something to gain politically or economically from resolving conflict, diplomats at Smolensk square will certainly go along with any solution in the interest of their masters. Still, lacking such incentives, there is little to expect out of Moscow in terms of working for peaceful settlements of frozen conflict in the FSU.

Vilhelm Konnander is an expert on Russia and Eastern Europe, focussing on international relations and security. He has previously served as President of the Swedish Society for the Study of Russia, Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia – the national “branch organisation” for regional analysts. Konnander currently works as a consultant for various companies, authorities and organisations.

Interview conducted by Gabriela Ioniţă

published in no.62, Cadran Politic Review, dec. 2008

http://www.cadranpolitic.ro/view_article.asp?item=2715

interview W.F. Engdahl-part 2

According to German Analyst F.W. Engdahl: There is no such thing as ‘EU Energy Independence’

По мнению немецкого аналитика FW Engdahl: “Существует нет такого понятия, как “энергетической независимости ЕС”

F. William Engdahl, is a famous economist and writer, author of the best-selling book on oil and geopolitics, “A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order”, which has been translated into French, Arabic, Korean, German, Croatian and Turkish. In 2007, he completed “Seeds of Destruction: The Hidden Agenda of GMO”. He has written on issues of political economy, geopolitics, energy, Worl Trade Organization (WTO), Internaţional Monetary Fund (IMF), for more than 30 years, beginning with the first oil shock and world grain crisis in the early 1970s. He currently lives in Germany and in addition to writing regularly on issues of economics, energy and international affairs, is active as a consulting geopolitical risk economist. In this fall is expected publication of the new book “Entire Dominate Spectru: Plans Geopolitice Backs Raising the Global Military Force to Washington”.

Considering the previous question (about moves USA and sales weapons), can Russia’s actions be set in the registry of a speculative intelligence or of asimetric answer? I take into account that in this year, before and after conflict with Georgia, Russia signed a couple of important agreements related to third party weapon selling contracts (e.g. Syria, Venesuela, China) and has intensified its military
exercises etc.

Russia is responding in an entirely assymetrical manner. They are upping cooperation with Venezuela and other nations in the so-called ‘Monroe Doctrine’ countries of Latin
America, forcing USA to respond there; they are upping Russian energy diplomacy in Central Asia and beyond, adding to links with nominally NATO countries in EU. They are also responding with increased military exercises designed to signal neutral or uneasy new NATO members from former Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact that NATO may not be the best security for them as USA is poorly prepared to step in to help. Important: Russia is responding by giving $5.4 billion emergency loan to Government of Iceland in its banking crisis, a neglected but now once more strategic NATO member.

As a result of the political instability and the present crises in Ukraine, which lead to
new anticipated elections, is it possible to exist a delaying of granting the MAP ? Shall we have a Ukraine about to return under the protective wing of Russia?

In Ukraine anything is possible. More, I would imagine Moscow is using all its economic and persuasive influence (directly or through intermediaries ) to try to support a non-NATO resolution of the crisis. From my point of view, the collapse of the Government in Kiew is directly related to events in Georgia.

Analyzing Prime-Minister Putin movings in some ex-soviet countries (Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkmenistan, etc), but relations with Iran too, and the economic contracts already signed or about to be signed, we may notice that Russia is doing whatever is necessary to realize a full control over the energy market in the area. Under these circumstances, is there any sense in continuing projects such as Nabucco to contribute to the energetic independence of Europe?

Nabucco is a very political project which is backed by Washington as an attempt to wean the region and the EU away from dependence on Russian natural gas. Nabucco is very
badly conceived and bogged down in endless quarrels at the moment. What speaking about ? There is no such thing as ‘EU Energy Independence’.
The EU realizes this which is why their response to the events of August in Georgia were so muted opposed to that of Washington.

Washington policy is precisely to drive a deep wedge between the EU countries, especially Germany, and Russia. They have not succeeded to date.

About the same subject. Regarding an integrated attitude of declarations and actions, will Europe find a way to communicate in a cohesive voice with Russia?

The EU itself is hopelessly split. It have governments like that of Tusk in Poland where the Foreign Minister Sikorsky is a neo-conservative trained in Washington, and it have nationalist governments trying to defend national interests as best as possible. In such a mixture of political and economic interests different is hard to find a common tone. Washington policy to the EU is and always has been: Divide et impera – Divide and rule.

There have been various speculations about a new cold war, a new iron curtain, isolating Russia. To what extent, at the beginning of the 21st century – under the actual circumstances of a more and more obvious globalization – something like
that can be possible?

The Old Cold War in a real sense never ended. One side – The USSR ended it, dissolved the Warsaw Pact and the USSR disintegrated. The other party refused to initiate comparable confidence building steps of winding down NATO, Instead it expended NATO very aggressively east to incorporate every possible former Warsaw Pact member. The attempt by Washington to push Georgia and Ukraine into NATO and to place Missiles and US-controlled missile defense in Poland and Czech Republic shows the farce of the end to the Cold War. The January 2007 US declaration that it would place US missiles and missile defense in Poland and Czech Republic, if you will, can be called the new onset of a New Cold War.

President Medvedev spoke about new security architecture inside a multipolar world. Let’s analyze this concept and to what extent it is possible to materialize it. What I have so far seen from the Russian press summaries, president Medvedev proposes a closer relation between Russia and the countries of EU, which is understandable and all to the good in my view. We need more details on concrete proposals from the Russian side, but the EU would do well in my view to respond to Medvedew seriously and propose dialogue on it.

interview conducted by Gabriela Ionita

Published in Cadran Politic Review – nov. 2008
http://www.cadranpolitic.ro/view_article.asp?item=2685